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Abstract
We propose a model where a regional government’s choice of the number of bureaucratic 
agencies operating in a region depends upon the degree of substitutability and comple-
mentarity of the bureaucratic services being demanded. We show that, if the government 
perceives the citizens’ demand as a demand for substitutable services, it will choose pro-
vision by two independent agencies. If the government perceives the citizens’ demand as 
a demand for complementary services, it will choose provision by a single consolidated 
agency. Exogenous shocks to the number of citizens amplify these incentives. Evidence 
from the Italian National Health Service (NHS) supports this hypothesis. Results show a 
positive effect of proxies of substitutable services on the number of regional local health 
authorities and a negative effect of proxies of complementary services. The major immi-
gration amnesties, taken as shocks to the number of citizens entitled to the service, mag-
nify these effects.
Keywords Bureaucratic institutional design · Public local health authorities · 
Consolidation and decentralization of local health authorities · Italian NHS
JEL Classification D73 · H75 · I18 · L32
Would you say it is normal to have regions with 7 provinces and 22 Local Health 
Authorities? […] In my opinion, the idea of regions with 7 provinces and 22 
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LHAs is an aberration. So if in agreement with the regions, since this task falls 
within their responsibilities, we can at last cut the number of managerial posi-
tions in the LHAs and apply ‘standard costs’ throughout, so that the proverbial 
needle has to cost the same in Calabria as in Lombardy, I would say this is a 
good thing. (Matteo Renzi, Italian PM, 10th April 2015, http://www.gover no.it/
media /consi glio-dei-minis tri-n58/619, 5:25-6:20; our translation)
1 Introduction
We study the determinants of Italian regional governments’ choices concerning the number 
of local health authorities (LHAs). Our argument is that, other things being equal, such 
decisions depend on whether the government perceives the citizens’ healthcare demand as 
a demand for substitutable or complementary services. We cite empirical results from the 
Italian National Health Service (NHS) in support of our hypothesis.
Consolidation of local bureaucratic organizations has occurred in different institutional 
contexts and sectors since the mid-1990 s (e.g., healthcare: Talbot and Johnson 2007 for 
the United Kingdom; McDaid et al. (2009) for Ireland; local governments: Andrews 2015 
for vertical consolidation in England; Blom-Hansen et al. 2016 for horizontal consolidation 
in Denmark). In Italy, consolidation of the healthcare sector has been on a large scale, the 
number of LHAs being cut from 638 in 1982 to 143 in 2012. Why do governments consoli-
date public bureaus and, more specifically, LHAs? The main motivation for consolidation 
presumably is cost reduction, thanks to economies of scale and scope, lower management 
and back-up costs, the introduction of cost-effective management styles, and the gain in 
monopsony power in negotiating with private sector providers (Garside 1999; Fulop et al. 
2002 for the United Kingdom; France et  al. 2005, p. S190 for Italy). The idea that cut-
ting the number of LHAs can reduce bureaucratic costs, heighten efficiency and free pub-
lic resources for investment in better healthcare services is popular among Italian national 
politicians (see the opening quotation). The academic literature also suggests political and 
institutional motivations for bureaucratic reorganization. Governments interested in policy 
reforms may see consolidation or decentralization as a way of strengthening their control 
over the bureaucracy (Lester et al. 1983 on environmental policy in the US states; Del Vec-
chio and Cuccurullo 2013 on the Italian NHS). Majoritarian electoral systems may facili-
tate the drive for bureaucratic reorganization (Pollitt 2007 for the United Kingdom). Con-
solidation/decentralization attitudes, moreover, are related to partisanship. For example, in 
Britain the Conservative governments of the early 1990 s expanded the number of LHAs in 
order to mimic competition (Le Grand 1999), whereas the New Labor governments, imple-
menting command and control policies, preferred to have fewer and larger LHAs (Good-
win 2000). Electoral considerations likewise may play a role. For example, hospital merg-
ers in the English NHS under New Labor were less common in election years, especially in 
swing districts (Gaynor et al. 2012).
In this paper, we propose an additional determinant of a government’s decision to con-
solidate public bureaus, which is driven by strategic incentives to reduce bureaucratic slack. 
We model the interaction between the government and the bureaus as a two-stage game 
(see also Fedeli and Santoni 2006). In the first stage, the government chooses whether to 
consolidate or to keep two bureaus separate. In the second stage, for given amounts of 
public resources, the government and the bureaus play a Nash budgetary game by choosing 
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their compliance levels (Miller 1977), namely, respectively, the share of resources to be 
allocated to the bureaucratic budget and the share of the budget to be devoted to service 
production. It turns out that in subgame perfect symmetric Nash equilibrium the govern-
ment can reduce bureaucratic slack by either promoting competition between bureaus when 
they produce services that it perceives as substitutes, or by consolidating bureaus produc-
ing complements. The basic mechanism at work is an externality in bureaucratic compli-
ance levels (i.e., effort levels): provided that the bureaus “care about” the government’s 
demand, their payoffs become interdependent in that an increase in compliance levels 
in one bureau induces the other bureau to raise (respectively, lower) its own compliance 
efforts when the services are complements (respectively, substitutes). With complements, 
the government has an incentive to induce the bureaus to internalize the externality by con-
solidating them into a single agency, whereas it prefers to keep them separated in the case 
of substitutes. The model also shows that those incentives are reinforced by shocks to the 
government’s demand for bureaucratic output that were not foreseeable at the time the gov-
ernment designs bureaucratic organization.
We test our hypotheses using regional data on the Italian NHS from 1982 to 2012. The 
NHS was established in 1978 and has been operative since 1980. It is a universal public 
healthcare system providing comprehensive insurance coverage and uniform health ben-
efits. It is financed partly by general taxation, along with user copayments for some ser-
vices. Central and regional governments share responsibility for funding and service provi-
sion. On the expenditure side, each of the 20 regional Italian governments sets the level of 
regional healthcare services provided and determines their administration and organization. 
Those decisions are subject to a common national legal and regulatory framework, which 
specifies healthcare standards (termed “essential levels of care”, or LEAs). On the financ-
ing side, until 2012 the central government set regional healthcare budgets using general 
revenues and allocating resources on the basis of historical expenditure and healthcare 
needs, irrespective of regional fiscal capacity (France et al. 2005, p. S194; Francese and 
Romanelli 2011, p. 6). Major reforms of NHS governance were enacted in 1992 and 1999 
to shift financing responsibilities to the regional governments and keep the NHS budget 
under control, but with mixed results.1
In the Italian NHS, each regional government establishes the number of regional LHAs, 
called Aziende Sanitarie Locali. They are independent organizations with full autonomy 
regarding their legal, organizational, administrative, financial, accounting, managerial and 
technical responsibilities. The president of the region appoints each LHA’s director on 
the basis of five-year renewable private contracts. The LHAs provide care both directly 
(through LHA-managed hospitals and territorial agencies offering primary care, outpatient 
facilities, and other services) and indirectly (paying accredited public and private provid-
ers, such as hospitals, nursing homes and laboratories). Each director bargains with the 
regional government over the LHA’s budget. Hence, a rational regional government can 
organize healthcare services in order to influence the outcome of its negotiations with the 
LHA’s management over the allocation of largely predetermined resources.
The empirical results offer support for the model we propose. As long as each regional 
government’s willingness to pay for healthcare services—which we assume reflects citizens’ 
preferences—is unobservable over time, we proxy that willingness on the basis of society’s 
1 Until the mid-1990 s, central government funding amounted to 90% of the overall NHS budget. In 2009 
it averaged 49%, with wide variations among the ordinary-statute regions (Mapelli 2012, pp. 107 and 111). 
Online Appendix 1 outlines the major features of the Italian NHS.
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evaluation of physical healthcare resources—inputs used in the transformation process—and 
produced outputs (Jacobs et al. 2006, chapter 2). In addition, we use the ratio of the number 
of general practitioners to NHS specialists and the ratio of the number of NHS specialists to 
hospital beds as proxies for substitutable healthcare services. The idea is that the government 
perceives the demand for primary care services as a substitute for specialty and inpatient care 
if, say, increasing minor surgery procedures in general practice reduces patients’ demands for 
in hospital-based minor surgery (Scott 1996). That would also be the case if the government 
observes that an increase in the number of visits to primary care physicians is associated with 
a reduction in the number of visits to public healthcare specialists (Atella and Deb 2008). 
Similarly, the government may perceive NHS specialists and hospital beds to be substitutes, 
if an increase in the number of privately paid visits to public hospital-based specialists (per-
forming examinations requiring medical equipment, say) lowers the demand for post-proce-
dure recovery in NHS hospitals (Turchetti 2009, pp. 116–117). On the other hand, we take 
the ratio between the number of general practitioners and NHS hospital beds as a proxy for 
the demand for complementary healthcare services. That may be the case if the government 
perceives that the citizens’ demand for the detection of illnesses is a demand for both primary 
care and inpatient care (Fortney et al. 2005). For example, the detection of diabetes mellitus 
may require both blood pressure measurement by a general practitioner and glycated hemo-
globin measurement and visit by a specialist diabetes team.
It turns out that variables proxying for the substitutable (complementary) services show 
a positive (negative) effect on the number of LHAs. Moreover, demand shocks, proxied 
by the two major Italian immigration amnesties in 1998 and 2002, magnify the incentives 
for consolidation or decentralization. The conclusions are not altered by controlling for: 
common time-specific shocks (supply-side and policy shocks to national healthcare laws 
and regulations); cost-side determinants (economies of scale); political and institutional 
factors (including election years, the regional government’s political “color”, and the type 
of regional electoral system); additional demand-side determinants of healthcare services 
(including regional per capita GDP and demographics); and time-invariant unobservable 
region-specific components (capturing, say, cultural differences).
Our paper also contributes to the empirical literature on the Italian NHS. However, 
whereas the existing literature focuses on healthcare expenditures and funding (Cellini 
et al. 2000; Giannoni and Hitiris 2002; Levaggi and Zanola 2003; Bordignon and Turati 
2009; Francese and Romanelli 2011; Atella et al. 2014; Fedeli 2015), this paper is the first 
to model the determinants of the number of LHAs.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a stylized model capturing a regional gov-
ernment’s strategic incentives to design the structures of public bureaus. Section 3 presents the 
data and the empirical model. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
2  The model
Borrowing both from the standard approach to the economic theory of bureaucracies (see, 
among others, Niskanen 1971; Migué and Bélanger 1974; Breton and Wintrobe 1975, 
1982; Forte and Powers 1994), and from the public choice literature’s insight that politi-
cians can increase bureaucratic efficiency by properly designing the organizational form of 
bureaucratic supply (Moe 1984, 2012; Bagnoli and McKee 1991; Ting 2002; Janssen et al. 
2003; Bates and Santerre 2008; Bates et al. 2011), and from Horn and Wolinsky (1988), 
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who develop the idea that consolidation depends on the extent of input substitutability, this 
section extends Fedeli and Santoni (2006) to the case of demand uncertainty. Consider a 
regional government willing to offer bureaucratic output (e.g., healthcare services). Output 
can be produced either separately by two independent agencies or jointly by a single con-
solidated agency. In the case we examine, agencies are LHAs supplying primary care (such 
as general practitioner visits and preventive care), secondary care (e.g., specialist visits in 
hospitals, hospitalization and medical assistance), or both.
The game sequence is as follows. At stage one, the regional government chooses 
whether to consolidate or to keep two bureaus separate. As long as each regional govern-
ment has sole responsibility for determining the number of LHAs, this assumption fits the 
Italian NHS. At stage two, the government negotiates over the budget with the bureau(s). 
Following the game-theoretic approach of Nikaidȏ and Isoda (1955) as applied by Miller 
(1977) and Fedeli (1999) to compliance relationships inside bureaucracies, each agent 
chooses simultaneously its own Nash compliance level. In particular, the government sets 
the share of public resources it allocates to the bureaus as a budget and the bureaus set the 
share of their budget that actually is used for producing the desired output. Depending on 
the outcome of stage one of the game, two subgames are considered. In the consolidation 
subgame, the government and the single bureau choose their own compliance strategies, by 
taking as given the strategies simultaneously chosen by the other agent. In the separation 
subgame, simultaneous bilateral Nash budget games are played between the government 
and each single bureau. Similar to Horn and Wolinsky’s (1988) Nash-in-Nash bargain-
ing solution,2 each bilateral negotiation selects its Nash equilibrium under the assumption 
that a Nash equilibrium will occur in the other negotiation as well. Then, the equilibrium 
bureaucratic organizational form and compliance levels arise in sub-game perfect Nash 
equilibrium.
The government’s preferences are
The first term represents a quadratic evaluation function of the bureaucratic production 
of differentiated outputs Qk, k = 1,2, with α > 0, β >0, β2 > 4γ2 and β > 2|γ| (Singh and Vives 
1984). We assume that the function derives from the preferences of the electoral constit-
uency (citizens or potential patients). The second term is the political rents the govern-
ment obtains from the budgetary process, which is equal to the difference between public 
resources R and the budget Bk = Rgk the regional government assigns to the bureaus, where 
gk ∈ [0,1] is the share of resources it allocates to the production of output k = 1, 2. R is 
predetermined by the central government based on observables (e.g., demographics), an 
assumption that fits the Italian NHS. Governmental maximization of (1) with respect to Qk 
gives
(1)G =
{
훼
[
퐐ퟏ+퐐ퟐ
]
−
[
훽
(
퐐ퟐ
ퟏ
+퐐ퟐ
ퟐ
)
2
]
− ퟐ훾Q1Q2
}
+
2∑
k=1
(R − Bk),
(2)Vk = 훼 + 휀 − 훽Qk − 2훾Ql,
2 Gaynor et al. (2015, pp. 254–258) apply the Horn and Wolinsky (1988) model to hospital-insurer price 
negotiations. Inhe current paper, decisions to merge bureaus or not are taken by the government, not by pro-
ducers. The Horn and Wolinsky (1988) solution concept originally was developed to examine incentives for 
horizontal mergers between trade unions in the presence of an exclusive vertical relationship with a single 
employer. Collard-Wexler et  al. (2018) review the industrial organization and labor economics literatures 
adopting the solution and provide microeconomic foundations for it.
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where we enter a common additive shock ε with E(ε) = 0 and E(ε2) = s2, to the solution. 
Vk, k = {1,2} and k  ≠  l, represents the government’s perception of the citizens’ willing-
ness to pay for Qk, given Ql. For γ < 0 the two outputs are complements. In that case, the 
willingness to pay for, say, general practitioners’ diagnostic services and referral to hos-
pital increases with the demand for hospitalization. For γ > 0 the outputs are substitutes. 
As such, the willingness to pay for, say, specialist visits in hospital declines when the 
demand for primary care physician visits rises. For γ = 0, the two outputs are independ-
ent. The shock ε affects linearly the government’s reservation price, thus the willingness to 
pay for bureaucratic output. That term can be interpreted as a shock to the population that 
is eligible, e.g., for public healthcare coverage. The shock occurs after the government’s 
organizational choice, but its realized value is public knowledge before stage two takes 
place. Regarding the Italian NHS, the shock can be related to the inflows and outflows of 
immigrant workers and their families in each region associated with national immigration 
amnesties. Following Klemperer and Meyer (1986), assume that the size of the shock is 
small enough so that both prices and bureaucratic output levels are positive.
Turning to bureaucratic preferences, with two independent bureaus (LHAs) we have decen-
tralization, D:
With one consolidated bureau we have centralization, C:
Equations  (3) and (4) assume that public agencies care about bureaucratic revenue and 
evaluate their activities according to Vk, namely the government’s perception of the citizens’ 
marginal willingness to pay for good k = 1, 2. The latter assumption (originating from Nis-
kanen 1971) fits the Italian NHS case, as the president of the region appoints the directors of 
the LHA, which means that they cannot ignore the politicians’ wishes. However, bureaus also 
are interested in slack. Slack is represented by the second term of both equations, where hk ∈ 
[0, 1] denotes the share of the public budget Bk that the bureau allocates to production. For 
simplicity, we assume that production occurs with constant-returns-to-labor technology at the 
minimum (symmetric) production cost c > 0, with 0 < c<α. Hence, total production costs are 
 TCk = cQk. That assumption enables us to single out the government’s strategic incentives in 
designing bureaucratic structure that are related to the demand side. In the empirical section, 
we control for possible determinants of cost, including the returns-to-scale regime. Note that, 
although production occurs at minimum average cost, the budgetary process generates ex post 
inefficiencies as far as some slack arises in equilibrium.
Solving the model by backward induction, in stage two the government and the bureaus 
choose compliance levels, given the centralization/decentralization choice at stage one and the 
realized value of the shock ε. From previous assumptions, public resources for producing good 
k can be written as hkgkR = cQk, implying that Qk = hkgkR/c, for k = 1,2. Substituting this back 
into Eqs. (1) and (3) or (4), preferences can be formulated in terms of the budgetary strategies 
gk and hk (Miller 1977) and the value of the shock ε. In the separation subgame D, the govern-
ment engages in a simultaneous compliance game with each bureau. The government chooses 
 gk by maximizing Eq. (1), taking as given the budgetary strategy of the bureau choosing  hk 
to maximize Eq. (3) given  gk. Both agents take the Nash outcome of the parallel compliance 
(3)LHA Dk = VkQk + Bk(1 − hk)
(4)LHA C =
2∑
k=1
LHA Dk =
2∑
i=k
VkQk +
2∑
i=k
Bk(1 − hk)
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game between the government and the other bureau as given, yielding the symmetric Nash 
equilibrium unconsolidated compliance levels:
In the consolidation subgame C, the government sets simultaneously  gk and  gl by tak-
ing as given the strategies  hk and  hl simultaneously set by the single bureau to maximize 
Eq. (4) for given gs. The solution yields the Nash equilibrium compliance levels:
Note that compliance levels always are positive and fall short of unity, provided the 
size of the shock is small enough. That result implies positive political rents and bureau-
cratic slack in Nash equilibrium. At stage one of the game, the government knows the 
distribution of the shock and its own state-contingent payoffs at stage two. Computing 
the government’s expected value function under D or C yields
Equation (5) shows that additive uncertainty raises the government’s expected payoff 
above its deterministic level by a term that is proportional to the variance of the shock 
 s2. Hence, the government chooses centralization as its subgame perfect Nash equilib-
rium strategy if and only if
namely for γ < 0, meaning that bureaus produce complementary outputs from the elector-
ate’s viewpoint. The intuition for this result is as follows. Provided that bureaus evaluate 
outputs according to the government’s demand, their payoffs become interdependent. When 
the outputs are complements, an increase in compliance by one bureau raises (lowers) the 
marginal utility of higher compliance by the other bureau. The government therefore has a 
strategic incentive to induce bureaus to internalize that externality by consolidating them 
into a single agency at stage one of the game, as long as consolidation reduces slack and 
raises the government’s expected utility. When the outputs are substitutes, γ > 0, however, 
the externality takes the opposite sign, and a single consolidated agency would set a lower 
compliance level, resulting in more slack in Nash equilibrium. In that situation, the govern-
ment has a strategic incentive to keep the two bureaus separated. Hence, unlike in Bag-
noli and McKee (1991) and contrary to the received view, promoting competition among 
ĝD
1
= ĝD
2
=
(𝛼 − c + 𝜀)[𝛼𝛽 + (𝛽 + 2𝛾)(c − 𝜀)]
4R(𝛽 + 𝛾)2
,
ĥD
1
= ĥD
2
=
2c(𝛽 + 𝛾)
[𝛼𝛽 + (𝛽 + 2𝛾)(c − 𝜀)]
ĝC
1
= ĝC
2
=
[
𝛼2 − (𝜀 − c)2
]
4R(𝛽 + 2𝛾)
,
ĥC
1
= ĥC
2
=
2c
[𝛼 + c − 𝜀]
.
(5)
E
(
ĜD
)
= 2R +
(𝛼 − c)2(𝛽 + 2𝛾)
4(𝛽 + 𝛾)2
+
s2(𝛽 + 2𝛾)
4(𝛽 + 𝛾)2
E
(
ĜC
)
= 2R +
(𝛼 − c)2
4(𝛽 + 2𝛾)
+
s2
4(𝛽 + 2𝛾)
,
(6)E
(
ĜC
)
− E
(
ĜD
)
= 𝛾
[
(𝛼 − c)2 + s2
][ (2𝛽 + 3𝛾)
4(𝛽 + 𝛾)2(𝛽 + 2𝛾)
]
> 0,
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bureaus does not necessarily increase bureaucratic efficiency, as that outcome depends on 
the nature of the externality in the budgetary process. Moreover, reducing bureaucratic 
slack in the presence of complements also implies an increase in government’s compliance 
(as long as the government’s marginal utility of greater compliance increases the bureau’s 
compliance level, i.e.,  gi and  hi are strategic complements from the government’s view-
point). As a consequence, bureaucratic production is higher when complements are pro-
duced by a consolidated bureau (i.e., QiC > QiD for γ < 0). Moreover, uncertainty enhances 
the government incentives to consolidate bureaus with complements and to keep them sep-
arated with substitutes.
2.1  The stochastic solution
In order to evaluate more explicitly the difference between the stochastic and the deterministic 
equilibrium solutions of the model, it is useful to decompose the stochastic component of the 
government’s expected value function under centralization C and rewrite Eq. (5), as follows:
Equation (7) shows that the stochastic shock alters the government’s tradeoff between the 
utility from political rents and that from the outputs. Let us explicate the economic intuition 
behind this result. In the stochastic case, the budget provided to the consolidated bureau is 
smaller, namely the government’s expected compliance E
(
⌢
g
C
)
− =
𝛼2−c2−s2
4R(𝛽+2𝛾)
 is lower than in 
the deterministic case, gC = 훼2 − c2
4R(훽+2훾)
 , implying that expected political rents are higher in the 
stochastic than in the deterministic case. However, although the equilibrium level of the out-
puts is the same in both cases, E
(
⌢
g
C
ĥCR
c
)
= E
(
𝛼+𝜀−c
2(𝛽+2𝛾)
)
=
𝛼−c
2(𝛽+2𝛾)
, by Jensen’s inequality the 
expected indirect utility from the outputs is lower in the stochastic than in the deterministic 
case, as long as the following is satisfied
Considering both effects and given that the government’s payoff is concave in outputs, 
the larger expected political rents in the stochastic case more than offset the reduction in the 
expected gains from the outputs. As a result, the expected payoff is increasing in the variance 
of the shock. The analysis of the stochastic component of the government’s expected value 
function under decentralization D is similar. It follows that the latter also will be increasing 
in the variance of the shock. Hence, uncertainty will enhance the government’s incentive to 
choose C with complements and to choose D with substitutes.
(7)
s2
4(훽 + 2훾)
=
s2
4(훽 + 2훾)
stochastic gains from rents
=
s2
4(훽 + 2훾)
stochasticloss from production
E
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣
⎛⎜⎜⎝
⌢
g
C
ĥCR
c
⎞⎟⎟⎠
2⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦ =
�
(𝛼 − c)2 + s2
4(𝛽 + 2𝛾)2
�
>
⎡⎢⎢⎣E
⎛⎜⎜⎝
⌢
g
C⌢
h
C
R
c
⎞⎟⎟⎠
⎤⎥⎥⎦
2
=
�
𝛼 − c
2(𝛽 + 2𝛾)
�2
.
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2.2  Exogenous shocks to the demand slopes
Following Klemperer and Meyer (1986), assume now that the exogenous shock influences the 
slopes of demand
with k, l = 1,2, k ≠ l and with E(ε) = 1, E(1/ε) > 1, E(ε2) = s2 > 1. Such a shock leaves both 
the degree of substitutability between bureaucratic outputs and the reservation price unaf-
fected. The shock can be interpreted as capturing as well an unexpected increase in the 
local population eligible for accessing bureaucratic output. Solving the model by backward 
induction, the players’ budgetary strategies at a symmetric Nash equilibrium when the gov-
ernment deals with one single bureau are
Therefore, at stage one of the game, the government’s expected payoff is
The symmetric budgetary strategies and the government’s expected payoff when 
dealing with two bureaus are:
Equations (10) and (12) show that the government’s expected payoffs are increasing 
in the variance of the shock, yielding:
Uncertainty about the elasticity of the demand curve reinforces the deterministic 
incentives of the government to consolidate the bureaus with complements (γ < 0) and 
(8)Vk = 훼 −
훽
휀
Qk −
2훾
휀
Ql,
(9)
⌣
g
C
1
=
⌣
g
C
2
=
(𝛼 − c)[2𝛼 − (𝛼 − c)𝜀]𝜀
4R(𝛽 + 2𝛾)
,
⌣
h
C
1
=
⌣
h
C
2
=
2c
2𝛼 − (𝛼 − c)𝜀
.
(10)
E
(
GC
)
= 2R
⏟ ⏟
deterministic payoff
+
2s2(훼 − c)2
4(훽 + 2훾)
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
stochastic gains in terms of rents
−
s2(훼 − c)2
4(훽 + 2훾)
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏟
stochastic loss in terms of output evaluation
.
(11)
gD
1
= gD
2
=
(훼 − c)[2훼(훽 + 훾) − (훼 − c)(훽 + 2훾)휀]휀
4R(훽 + 훾)2
,
hD
1
= hD
2
=
2c(훽 + 훾)
2훼(훽 + 훾) − (훼 − c)(훽 + 2훾)휀
.
(12)
E
(
GD
)
= 2R
⏟ ⏟
deterministic payoff
+
2s2(훼 − c)2(훽 + 2훾)
4(훽 + 2훾)
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
stochastic gain in terms of rents
−
s2(훼 − c)2(훽 + 2훾)
4(훽 + 2훾)
.
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
stochastic loss in terms of output evaluation
(13)E
(
GC
)
− E
(
GD
)
= −𝛾
[
(𝛼 − c)2s2
][ 2𝛽 + 3𝛾
4(𝛽 + 2𝛾)(𝛽 + 𝛾)2
]
> 0.
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to keep the bureaus separated with substitutes (γ > 0). This confirms the previous find-
ings derived under the assumption of an additive exogenous shock.
3  Data description and empirical framework
Generalizing the implications of the theoretical model, we derive two testable 
predictions.
H1 There is a negative (positive) correlation between the number of regional bureaucratic 
agencies, e.g., LHAs, and the citizens’ demand for complementary (substitutable) health-
care services.
H2 Shocks to the demand for bureaucratic output strengthen the negative (positive) cor-
relation between the number of bureaus and the electorate’s demand for complementary 
(substitutable) healthcare services.
3.1  Data
The empirical analysis builds on yearly data for the 20 Italian regions over the 1982–2012 
period. LHAs or Aziende Sanitarie Locali, our dependent variable, is the number of basic 
independent agencies of the Italian NHS that provide comprehensive healthcare ser-
vices. Each LHA receives its budget from the regional government. National law empow-
ers the regions to determine the number and organization of the LHAs (Law 833/1978, 
Law 502/1992, and Legislative Decree 228/1999). Over the sample period, all 20 regions 
reduced to some extent the number of LHAs. The 1992 NHS reform actually triggered 
LHA consolidation in almost all of the regions in 1995, though to different extents and at 
a different pace across regions. (Del Vecchio and Cuccurullo 2013, pp. 36–37, provide a 
taxonomy of regional consolidations in 1995–2013.)
To test the model’s predictions, we need variables measuring the regional governments’ 
perception of citizens’ demand for healthcare services. Because regional citizens’ willing-
ness to pay is unobservable, as in Jacobs et al. (2006), we proxy willingness to pay using 
the social evaluation of physical inputs used in the transformation process and produced 
healthcare outputs. The first variable we consider is the ratio of the number of general prac-
titioners to the number of specialists working for public and private accredited NHS hos-
pitals per 1000 inhabitants (GPs/Specialists), which we take as a proxy for the demand 
for substitutable services. That interpretation is consistent with theory and evidence. For 
example, Atella and Deb (2008) use survey data to show that, when unobserved hetero-
geneity is taken into account, patients perceive GPs and in-hospital specialists as sub-
stitute medical care providers. Fortney et  al. (2005, pp. 1424–1425) argue that from the 
patient’s standpoint primary care is a substitute for secondary care when by prevention or 
early detection of disease (e.g., “prevention of stroke by treatment of hypertension”) or 
by management of chronic conditions (e.g., “control of blood sugar to avert kidney fail-
ure in patients with diabetes mellitus”), the need for specialty care is delayed or avoided. 
Evidence of substitutability is drawn from the US Department of Veteran Affairs (Fortney 
et al. 2005). Wright and Ricketts (2010) show that a greater concentration of primary care 
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physicians, depending on the geographical level of the data, is associated with a reduction 
in inpatient hospital admissions and emergency room visits (also see Scott 1996; van Dijk 
et al. 2014).
Our second proxy for substitutability is the ratio of the number of specialists to the num-
ber of accredited NHS hospital beds per 1000 inhabitants (Specialists/Hospital beds). The 
number of specialists is a proxy for healthcare demand by fee-paying patients and the num-
ber of beds is taken as a proxy for their demand for hospitalization services. That inter-
pretation is based on the argument that, in Italy, specialists working in NHS hospitals for 
fixed salaries also can see patients as private professionals outside their contracted hours of 
public sector work. Private professional activities can be offered either intramoenia (in the 
specialist’s NHS hospital) or extramoenia (outside it). The overwhelming majority (more 
than 94%) operate intramoenia, which may be explained by the incentive mechanisms built 
into the law. When visiting outpatients and inpatients intramoenia, specialists use NHS 
facilities, so each hospital autonomously fixes the fees that the specialists’ patients must 
pay, subject to regional regulations. It is widely believed that private specialists’ visits 
reduce the need for NHS hospital recovery by providing diagnosis and diagnostic tests 
that otherwise would be part of the NHS hospitalization service package (Turchetti 2009, 
pp. 116–117). Note that, although the choice between the intramoenia and extramoenia 
regimes was introduced in 1996 (Law 662/1996, Legislative Decree 229/1999, and Laws 
138/2004 and 120/2007), since 1980 the specialists working in public hospitals have had 
the right to private professional practice as well (Presidential Decree 761/1979).
Our third empirical proxy captures the demand for complementary healthcare services. 
In Italy, as in other countries such as the United Kingdom, the GP’s prescription deter-
mines whether a patient needs publicly provided specialty care, meaning that patients can 
see the GPs’ services of “gatekeeping” and referral as complementary to the hospitaliza-
tion services (Maio and Manzoli 2002). We take the number of beds in public and private 
accredited NHS hospitals as a proxy for the citizens’ demand for hospitalization services 
and proxy the demand for GPs’ gatekeeping services with the number of GPs (van Dijk 
et al. 2014). Thus, the ratio of the number of GPs to the number of NHS hospital beds per 
1000 inhabitants (GPs/Hospital beds) serves as a measure of the demand for complemen-
tary healthcare services.
Summary statistics for the variables used and data sources are reported in Table 1.
3.2  The empirical model
We assume that the variation in the number of LHAs in region i at time t, ∆LHAit, is given 
by:
where GPs/Specialistsit−1, GPs/Hospital bedsit−1 and Specialists/Hospital bedsit−1 are the 
proxies for the regional demand for differentiated healthcare services; μt and  uit are time 
dummies and the random iid error term.
Equation (14) is a convenient representation of the adjustment of the number of LHAs 
towards its long-run level. The dependent variable is the variation in the observed number 
of regional LHAs, which is zero until the regional government decides otherwise. There 
are 55 such changes in our sample period, all of them representing consolidation. Hence, 
the dependent variable is censored, which makes the Tobit approach the natural estimation 
(14)
ΔLHAit =휌LHAit−1 + 휋1(GPs∕Specialists)it−1 + 휋2(GPs∕Hospital beds)it−1
+ 휋3(Specialists∕Hospital beds)it−1 + 훉퐗it−1 + 휇t + uit,
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framework. Our estimation strategy is based on: (i) the nature of the dependent variable, 
which often is zero; (ii) the assumption that the regional fixed effects are not statistically 
significant because they are removed by differencing the dependent variable (a hypothesis 
we can test for); and, finally, (iii) the reasonable thesis that given the “large T, small N” set-
ting, the bias introduced by the presence of the lagged dependent variable is in any case not 
sizeable (less than 2% even if N were large, which is far from the case here). The independ-
ent variables all are assumed to affect the variation in the number of LHAs at time t − 1, 
because of the time needed for the regional government to adjust its budget target once 
they are observed. That assumption also helps to control for simultaneity and reverse cau-
sality. Entering the lagged dependent variables in our estimating equation help minimize 
potential omitted variables bias in the model, and ρ gives a measure of the speed of adjust-
ment to the desired level. Finding ρ to be statistically significant and negative helps rule out 
non-stationarity of the dependent variable.
The three main independent variables of interest are non-linear combinations of three 
variables, GPs, Specialists and Hospital beds, allowing us to identify the three parame-
ters in which we are interested. We expect that the higher is the GPs/Specialists ratio, the 
higher is the regional demand for substitutable health care services. Similarly, because pri-
vate visits reduce the need for hospitalization, patients see specialists and hospital recovery 
as substitute healthcare service providers. Accordingly, we hypothesize that the higher is 
the Specialists/Hospital beds ratio, the higher is the regional demand for substitute ser-
vices. Hence, the higher is the GPs/Specialists ratio or the higher is the Specialists/Hospi-
tal beds ratio, the greater is the government’s desired number of LHAs. Finally, we expect 
that the higher is the GPs/Hospital beds ratio, the higher is the regional demand for com-
plementary healthcare services and, hence, the lower is the desired number of LHAs.
The vector X is a set of control variables drawn from the previous literature that are 
meant to capture economic, sociodemographic, political and institutional features that 
potentially affect the regional governments’ organizational choices. In what follows, we 
describe only the control variables of our preferred model (see online Appendix  2 for 
a detailed description of the estimating model, identification, the selection of the set of 
regressors, and robustness checks). The first control variable is the (natural logarithm of) 
average number of beds per NHS hospital, which Bordignon and Turati (2009, p. 313) take 
as a proxy for economies of scale in the production of healthcare services. Because LHA 
consolidation often is motivated by taking advantage of scale economies, we expect that 
the larger is the average number of beds per hospital, the lower is the desired number of 
regional LHAs. The empirical evidence shows that non-linear economies of scale exist in 
the Italian hospital sector. As the number of beds per hospital rises above a certain thresh-
old, diseconomies of scale are likely to emerge (Cellini et al. 2000, p. 511; Schiavone 2008, 
pp. 11–13). If that is the case, an increase in the number of beds per hospital is not neces-
sarily associated with an efficiency incentive for consolidation. In order to check for poten-
tial non-linearities, we include as a regressor the squared value of the log of the regional 
ratio of beds to hospitals.
The second control variable is the number of Aziende Sanitarie Ospedaliere (Hospital 
Trusts, hereafter HTs). The HTs were introduced by the 1992 NHS reform (Article 4 of 
Law 502/1992; Law 405/2001). The HTs are highly specialized hospitals with a national 
profile. Their legal status and activities broadly are akin to those of the UK Hospital Trusts. 
They are independent public enterprises with full legal, administrative and managerial 
autonomy. They produce healthcare services directly. They serve as reference structures 
for emergency services and acute care within their geographical areas. The president of the 
region appoints their directors. Each regional government is empowered to determine the 
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number of HTs, subject to criteria established by the national law. The HTs receive their 
budgets from the LHAs, which purchase their services. In practice, such contractual rela-
tions exist in four regions (Lombardy, Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany and Umbria). The other 
16s regional governments allocate budgets to HTs directly (France et  al. 2005, p. S191; 
Mapelli 2012, p. 220). The introduction of the HTs (most notably in Lombardy, Sicily and 
Campania) partially offset reductions in the number of LHAs. Finally, we enter a dummy 
variable to control for electoral cycles (Election), which is equal to 1 in the years with a 
general political election or regional election and is equal to 0 otherwise. We expect that 
regional governments with partisan/electoral motivations will reorganize their LHAs in 
closer alignment with citizens’ wishes (their healthcare demands) and in proximity of elec-
tion years.
We identify regional demand shocks by controlling for changes in population associated 
with the major national immigration amnesties of 1998 and 2002. Interacting those vari-
ables with our proxies, the model is:
Shockit(j), j = 1,2 is the change in population following the 1998 and 2002 amnesties, 
including family reunions. Over the sample period, actually, Italy enacted five immigra-
tion amnesties for undocumented workers, namely, in 1986, 1990, 1995, 1998 and 2002. 
Those of 1998 and 2002 involved the largest numbers (Fasani 2009) and had important 
implications for the NHS. Specifically, in 1998 a center-left government sponsored the 
“Turco-Napolitano” Law (Law 40/1998, Legislative Decree 286/1998), named after the 
two cabinet members who proposed it to parliament. The law laid down Italian policy on 
immigrants’ entry, residence and working conditions and on the deportation and control 
of undocumented immigrants. The law made it compulsory for documented immigrant 
workers to join the NHS, with the same tax obligations and healthcare rights as Italian 
citizens. It specified that NHS coverage had to be extended to their family members with 
regular residence permits, including their children. It further established that regularized 
immigrant workers had the right to apply for the reunion with their spouses, children and 
non-working parents living outside Italy. The amnesty associated with the law regularized 
217,124 undocumented workers who already were living in the country. In 2002, a center-
right government sponsored the “Bossi-Fini” Law (Law 189/2002), likewise named after 
two cabinet members. The Bossi-Fini Law amended Turco-Napolitano and introduced new 
clauses regulating undocumented immigration to Italy. It came into force in August and 
was followed by Decree Law 195/2002 on the procedures for regularizing undocumented 
immigrant workers already in the country in September. That amnesty regularized 702,156 
undocumented workers, 47% of all those regularized during our sample period. All regu-
larized immigrant workers received residency permits with durations equal to the lengths 
of their employment contracts. The residence permits gave them the right to access the 
NHS directly as well as to apply for family reunion (Devillanova 2008; Pellizzari 2013). 
Based on our theoretical model, we expect φ1, φ2 and φ3 to have the same signs as π1, π2 
and π3. If so, the evidence tells in favor of H2. Note that, because the amnesty variables 
clearly are demand-side regressors, such evidence would further support their use as prox-
ies for the government’s perception of citizens’ healthcare demands.
(15)
ΔLHAit =휌LHAit−1 +
(
휋1 + 휑1Shock
(j)
it
)
(GPs∕Specialists)it−1 +
(
휋2 + 휑2Shock
(j)
it
)
(GPs∕Hospital beds)it−1
+
(
휋3 + 휑1Shock
(j)
it
)
(Specialists∕Hospital beds)it−1 + 훉퐗it−1 + 휇t + uit ,
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4  Results
The results for the initial specification of the estimating model are given in Column 
(a) of Table 2. Standard errors are consistent with autocorrelation and heteroscedastic-
ity. The lagged dependent variable is statistically significant and negative, as expected, 
which supplies evidence in favor of the existence of some inertia in the adjustment pro-
cess. The coefficient is small, in line with the hypothesis of gradual adjustment of the 
number of LHAs to the long-run level. The results support H1. They suggest that the 
change in the number of LHAs is positively correlated at standard levels of significance 
with GPs/Specialists and Specialists/Hospital beds, our measures of the government’s 
Table 2  Results for Hypothesis 1
Column (a) reports the Tobit estimates for the impact of the proxes for government’s perception of citizens’ 
demand. Column (b) reports coefficients controlled for supply and policy shocks, where the non-linear 
specification of the economies of scale, the variation in the number of hospital trusts, and the presence of 
an election dummy are added to the set of regressors. Column (c) controls estimated parameters for region-
specific time trends and, finally, Column (d) reports results controlled for endogeneity. Standard errors in 
parenthesis are robust to autocorrelation and heteroschedasticity. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Model (a) (b) (c) (d)
Dependent variable ∆LHAi,t ∆LHAi,t ∆LHAi,t ∆LHAi,t
LHAi,t−1 − 0.068*** − 0.051*** − 0.274*** − 0.043***
(0.022) (0.016) (0.062) (0.007)
Specialists/Hospital  bedsi,t−1 0.117*** 0.166*** 0.337*** 0.251***
(0.041) (0.047) (0.089) (0.064)
GPs/Hospital  bedsi,t−1 − 0.224** − 0.304*** − 0.467* − 0.422***
(0.094) (0.102) (0.262) (0.138)
GPs/Specialistsi,t−1 0.069** 0.083*** 0.132** 0.086***
(0.028) (0.029) (0.058) (0.036)
Economies of  scalei,t−1 0.176** 0.397* 0.126**
(0.085) (0.286) (0.080)
Economies of scale2i,t−1 − 0.016** − 0.036 − 0.011**
(0.008) (0.026) (0.007)
∆HTi,t−1 − 1.608*** − 1.552*** − 2.001***
(0.457) (0.357) (0.097)
Electioni,t−1 1.402** 1.111** 1.098**
(0.648) (0.461) (0.430)
Constant − 4.219** − 55.722** − 121.738 − 43.981**
(1.821) (24.267) (81.682) (22.229)
F-test (31, 580) for time dummies 8.600*** 8.890*** 8.450*** 47.040***
F-test (38, 510) for region specific time trends 4.210***
Wald test for exogeneity (p value) 6.61 (0.158)
Log-likelihood − 1643.52 − 1517.94 − 1475.27
Pseudo-R2 0.0696 0.1149 0.1398
Number of observations 580 560 560 560
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perception of citizens’ demand for substitutes, and negatively correlated with GPs/Hos-
pital beds, our measure for the demand for complements.
The results reported in Table 2 are robust to region-specific fixed effects (removed 
by first differencing), and to common supply shocks, controlled for with the full set of 
time dummies. In one second exercise, we add several variables to the set of regressors, 
following a general-to-specific approach. The results of that approach are summarized 
in Column (b) of Table 2, where our model in Column (a) is augmented by adding our 
measure of economies of scale (in its non-linear specification), the variation in the num-
ber of HTs, and the dummy for elections. The variable capturing economies of scale is 
statistically significant at the 5% level with a positive sign, and negative for its squared 
value. Therefore, an increase in the number of beds per hospital is associated at first 
with an increase in the desired number of LHAs, but above a certain threshold a further 
increase gives the government an incentive to consolidate.
The value of the Economies of scale variable peaks at around 240–280 beds per hospi-
tal, which compares well with the literature on that issue. The results also suggest that the 
change in the number of HTs is negatively correlated, at the 1% significance level, with 
the change in the number of LHAs. Our interpretation is that governments perceive their 
citizens seeing the acute healthcare services provided by HTs as complementary to the 
primary and secondary healthcare that the LHAs either produce directly or procure from 
accredited private providers. Therefore, an increase in the number of HTs is taken as an 
increase in a region’s demand for complementary healthcare services, which in our model 
should be negatively correlated with the number of LHAs. Finally, we control for whether 
an election was held in the year prior to the change in the number of LHAs. The sign of 
Election suggests that the number of LHAs is more likely to change in years preceding the 
elections.
Concerns relate to the potential omitted variable, to potential correlation of the error 
term with the beginning-of-period number of LHAs, LHAit−1, and to potential correlation 
of the former with the main independent variables of interest, namely GPs/Specialistsit−1, 
GPs/Hospital bedsit−1 and Specialists/Hospital bedsit−1. The three concerns differ. Clearly, 
a crucial question is checking the extent to which results are robust to omitted variables 
other than those we have added to the set of regressors. To investigate this matter, we 
have added the full set of region specific time trends. Results are reported in Column (c), 
showing that, if anything, the impact of interests are larger (in absolute value) than those 
reported in Column (b). The endogeneity of LHAit−1 derives from its potential correlation 
with the fixed component of the error term. The bias is relevant in the “small T, large N” 
setup, which is not our case. The second issue relates to simultaneity and reverse causality 
among the variables. We have addressed that concern by lagging the variables. However, 
despite the previous arguments, we nevertheless estimated a full instrumental variables 
specification. We did so for the three regressors of interest by entering the initial values 
of the variables for each region as instruments for all the subsequent values, as in a GMM 
approach, and three predetermined regressors, namely the lagged mortality rate, the lagged 
infant mortality rate, and the variation in the differenced number of LHAs per capita. The 
results are reported in Column (d) and show that the test for exogeneity does not reject 
the hypothesis that the set of instruments is valid. As before, the estimated parameters are 
larger than those from our preferred specification.3
3 We have performed a number of robustness exercises. Our results are robust to the exclusion of the non-
linear combination of the other two regressors, Specialists/Hospital beds, from the estimating model; to 
the presence of supply shocks and common policy choices (such as 1999’s second NHS reform); to the 
presence of a dummy variable for year 1995, a linear trend, a logarithmic trend and the full set of time dum-
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Table 3 reports the results from testing H2, namely the hypothesis that shocks to the 
government’s perceived demand for differentiated healthcare services reinforce the incen-
tive to consolidate in the case of complements and to keep LHAs separated in the case of 
substitutes. Table 3 introduces the two demand-shock proxies to our preferred specifica-
tion, namely the changes in regional populations induced by the Bossi-Fini law (Column a) 
and the Turco-Napolitano law (Column b). Those shocks enter the set of regressors and are 
interacted with our relevant variables. The results show that for all of the demand shocks, 
the estimated coefficients of the demand proxies are statistically significant. The interaction 
Table 3  Results for Hypothesis 2
We report results from our preferred model where the coefficients are interacted with two exogenous 
demand shocks, namely (a) the Bossi-Fini shock and (b) the Turco-Napolitano shock. In all the models, 
the set of control variables is as in Column (c) of Table 2 (parameters are not reported). Standard errors in 
parenthesis are robust to autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Model (a) (b)
Dependent variable ∆LHAi,t ∆LHAi,t
LHAi,t−i − 0.051***
(0.016)
− 0.051***
(0.016)
Specialists/Hospital  bedsi,t−1 0.175***
(0.049)
0.162***
(0.048)
GPs/Hospital  bedsi,t−1 − 0.298***
(0.103)
− 0.292***
(0.102)
GPs/Specialistsi,t−1 0.083***
(0.029)
0.081***
(0.029)
Specialists/Hospital  bedsi,t−1 × Bossi  Finii,t−1 0.140**
(0.067)
GPs/Hospital  bedsi,t−1 × Bossi  Finii,t−1 − 0.413**
(0.181)
GPs/Specialistsi,t−1 × Bossi  Finii,t−1 0.186**
(0.082)
Bossi  Finii,t−1 − 0.063**
(0.031)
Specialists/Hospital  bedsi,t−1 × Turco  Napolitanoi,t−1 0.085***
(0.029)
GPs/Hospital  bedsi,t−1 × Turco  Napolitanoi,t−1 − 0.206***
(0.070)
GPs/Specialistsi,t−1 × Turco  Napolitanoi,t−1 0.077***
(0.026)
Turco  Napolitanoi,t−1 −0.032***
(0.011)
F-test (31, 560) for time dummies 8.950*** 8.790***
log*likelihood −1516.50 −1517.52
Pseudo-R2 0.1158 0.1152
Number of observations 560 560
mies. We also have performed the empirical analysis using the within-group estimator. The results of all 
checks are substantially consistent with those presented here. Online Appendix 2 provides a discussion of 
these robustness checks and presents the associated results.
Footnote 3 (continued)
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terms have the expected sign (positive for the demand for substitutes, negative for comple-
ments) and are statistically significant at the 5% level or below. These results confirm the 
predictions of our theoretical model. Other things being equal, an increase in the regional 
demand for substitute healthcare services is associated with an increase of the number of 
LHAs, while an increase in the demand for complementary healthcare services is associ-
ated with a decline in the number os LHAs. The incentives for consolidation and decen-
tralization are amplified by shocks to demand.
Because the estimated Tobit coefficients represent the marginal effects of the independ-
ent variables on the latent variable (here, the desired change in the number of LHAs), we 
compute the marginal effects of our proxies for the demand for differentiated healthcare 
services on the observed outcome variable. Table 4 reports the results. As expected, the 
marginal effects are smaller than those derived from the Tobit estimates on the latent vari-
able. The evidence supports H2, which predicts that the magnitudes of the estimated coef-
ficients increase (in absolute value) when the demand shocks are considered.
5  Conclusions
This paper has analyzed the incentives of the Italian regional governments to consolidate 
local health authorities (LHAs). We have tested the hypothesis, derived from a stylized 
model, that, when a regional government perceives its citizens as demanding complemen-
tary healthcare services, it has an incentive to consolidate individual LHAs. In the case of 
the demand for substitute services, the regional government has an interest in dealing with 
a larger number of smaller LHAs. Our Tobit estimates for the years 1982–2012 show that 
those incentives are likely to have been in place in the Italian NHS. Over the sample period, 
the number of LHAs has been reduced drastically. Unquestionably, most of this reduction 
has been forced on the regional governments, which have the legal power to set the number 
of LHAs, by central government legislation and regulations since the mid-1990 s aimed at 
Table 4  Marginal effects
Column (a) reports marginal coefficients from our preferred model. In Columns (b) and (c) we report mar-
ginal effects when the variables are interacted with the Bossi Fini law and the Turco Napolitano law vari-
ables, respectively. P values are shown in parenthesis
(a) (b) (c)
Exogenous demand shocks Absent Variable interacted with
Marginal effect on ∆LHAi,t of Bossi Fini Turco Napolitano
GPs/Specialistsi,t 0.0302 0.0824 0.0593
(0.012) (0.002) (0.000)
GPs/Hospital  bedsi,t − 0.1013 − 0.2306 − 0.1900
(0.045) (0.002) (0.001)
Specialists/Hospital  bedsi,t 0.0600 0.1091 0.0959
(0.019) (0.001) (0.000)
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cost-cutting. This paper has argued that, in order to gauge regional governments’ incentives 
for consolidating, we should also look at the demand side.
The approach followed in this paper emphasizes the government’s strategic choice 
of bureaucratic organization, namely the government’s use of a control mechanism that 
operates ex ante (Moe 2012). However, as firstly argued by Breton and Wintrobe (1975), 
governments might also impose direct controls on bureaus. Such controls are costly and 
may take different forms of direct monitoring of bureaus associated with both different 
performance targets and different systems of rewards and sanctions, which, in turn, depend 
on regional regulations. What difference would the inclusion of control costs make to the 
argument presented in this paper? We would expect that the higher the cost of direct con-
trol, the more effective institutional design might be as opposed to direct control. For exam-
ple, if specialists are costlier to control than general practitioners, we would expect that 
promoting competition between bureaus producing substitutes will be more effective than 
direct control.4 Moreover, we would expect that introducing direct controls might affect our 
main results in so far as control costs vary between organizational forms. If controlling a 
consolidated agency is less costly than controlling two separate agencies (because of, say, 
economies of scale and scope in the control technology), consolidation might emerge as 
the optimal governmental choice irrespective of the nature of the healthcare services being 
provided. If instead government’s monitoring is more efficient in smaller than in larger 
agencies, separation might emerge as the government’s preferred choice. However, if the 
two potential effects of organizational form on control costs balance each other out, we 
would expect no change in our main findings. Following the reasoning of Coase (1937), 
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Breton and Wintrobe (1975), these different effects also 
might depend on the types of control device chosen. This, in turn, might also pose the 
issue of institutional design of bureaucratic agencies of control, or independent authorities, 
which we leave for future research.
Acknowledgements We would like to thank three referees for their insightful comments and suggestions, 
and participants to the Workshop on Macroeconomics, rationality and institutions held at Università La 
Sapienza in Rome on December 14th–15th 2017. Any mistakes are ours.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creat iveco mmons .org/licen ses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, 
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the 
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
References
Alchian, A. A., & Demsetz, H. (1972). Production, information costs, and economic organization. American 
Economic Review, 62, 777–795.
Andrews, R. (2015). Vertical consolidation and financial sustainability: Evidence from English local gov-
ernment. Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 33, 1518–1545.
Atella, V., Belotti, F., Depalo, D., & Piano Mortari, A. (2014). Measuring spatial effects in presence of 
institutional constraints: The case of Italian Local Health Authority expenditure. Regional Science and 
Urban Economics, 49, 232–241.
Atella, V., & Deb, P. (2008). Are primary care physicians, public and private sector specialists substitutes 
or complements? Evidence from a simultaneous equations model for count data. Journal of Health 
Economics, 27, 770–785.
4 We thank one referee for suggesting this argument.
284 Public Choice (2018) 177:265–285
1 3
Bagnoli, M., & McKee, M. (1991). Controlling the game: Political sponsors and bureaus. Journal of Law 
Economics and Organization, 7, 229–247.
Bates, L. J., Lafrancois, B. A., & Santerre, R. E. (2011). An empirical study of the consolidation of local 
public health services in Connecticut. Public Choice, 147, 107–121.
Bates, L. J., & Santerre, R. E. (2008). The demand for local public health services. Do unified and inde-
pendent public health departments spend differently? Medical Care, 46, 590–596.
Blom-Hansen, J., Houlberg, K., Serritzlew, S., & Treisman, D. (2016). Jurisdiction size and local gov-
ernment expenditure: Assessing the effect of municipal amalgamation. American Political Science 
Review, 110, 812–831.
Bordignon, M., & Turati, G. (2009). Bailing out expectations and public health expenditure. Journal of 
Health Economics, 28, 305–321.
Breton, A., & Wintrobe, R. (1975). The equilibrium size of a budget-maximizing bureau: A note on Nis-
kanen’s theory of bureaucracy. Journal of Political Economy, 83, 195–207.
Breton, A., & Wintrobe, R. (1982). The logic of bureaucratic conduct: An economic analysis of competition, 
exchange and efficiency in private and public organizations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cellini, R., Pignataro, G., & Rizzo, I. (2000). Competition and efficiency in health care: An analysis of the 
Italian case. International Tax and Public Finance, 7, 503–519.
Coase, R. H. (1937). The nature of the firm. Economica, 4, 386–405.
Collard-Wexler, A., Gowrisankaran, G., & Lee, R. S. (2018). ‘Nash-in-Nash bargaining’: A microfounda-
tion for applied work, Journal of Political Economy (forthcoming).
Del Vecchio, M., & Cuccurullo, C. (2013). La dimensione ideale dell’Azienda tra economie di scala, 
logiche di governo e corporate identity. Quaderni FIASO, Position paper, June.
Devillanova, C. (2008). Social networks, information and health care utilization: Evidence from undocu-
mented immigrants in Milan. Journal of Health Economics, 27, 265–286.
Fasani, F. (2009). Undocumented migration in Italy: A country report. CLANDESTINO project—count-
ing the uncountable. Data and Trends across Europe–6th FP–European Commission.
Fedeli, S. (1999). Competing bureaus and politicians: A compliance approach to the diversion of public 
funds. Public Choice, 100, 253–270.
Fedeli, S. (2015). The impact of GDP on health care expenditure: The case of Italy (1982–2009). Social 
Indicators Research, 122, 347–370.
Fedeli, S., & Santoni, M. (2006). The government choice of bureaucratic organization: An application to 
Italian state museums. Journal of Cultural Economics, 30, 41–72.
Forte, F., & Powers, C. H. (1994). Applying game theory to the protection of public funds: Some intro-
ductory notes. European Journal of Law and Economics, 1, 193–212.
Fortney, J. C., Steffick, D. E., Burgess, J. F., Jr., Maciejewski, M. L., & Petersen, L. A. (2005). Are 
primary care services a substitute or complement for specialty and inpatient services? Health 
Research and Educational Trust, 40, 1423–1442.
France, G., Taroni, F., & Donatini, A. (2005). The Italian health-care system. Health Economics, 14, 
S187–S202.
Francese, M., & Romanelli, M. (2011). Health care in Italy: Expenditure determinants and regional dif-
ferentials. Bank of Italy Working Paper n. 828.
Fulop, N., Protopsaltis, G., Hutchings, A., King, A., Allen, P., Normand, C., et al. (2002). Process and 
impact of mergers of NHS trusts: Multicentre case study and management cost analysis. British 
Medical Journal, 325, 249–252.
Garside, P. (1999). Evidence based mergers? British Medical Journal, 318, 445–446.
Gaynor, M., Ho, K., & Town, R. J. (2015). The industrial organization of health-care markets. Journal of 
Economic Literature, 53, 235–284.
Gaynor, M., Laudicella, M., & Propper, C. (2012). Can governments do it better? Merger mania and hos-
pital outcomes in the English NHS. Journal of Health Economics, 31, 528–543.
Giannoni, M., & Hitiris, T. (2002). The regional impact of health care expenditure: The case of Italy. 
Applied Economics, 34, 1829–1836.
Goodwin, N. (2000). Leadership and the UK health service. Health Policy, 51, 49–60.
Horn, H., & Wolinsky, A. (1988). Bilateral monopolies and incentives to merge. Rand Journal of Eco-
nomics, 19, 408–419.
Jacobs, R., Smith, P. C., & Street, A. (2006). Measuring efficiency in health care. Analytic techniques 
and health policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Janssen, R. T. J. M., Leers, T., Meijdam, L. C., & Verbo, H. A. A. (2003). Bureaucracy versus market in 
hospital care. Public Choice, 114, 477–489.
Klemperer, P., & Meyer, M. (1986). Price competition vs. quantity competition: The role of uncertainty. 
RAND Journal of Economics, 17, 618–639.
285Public Choice (2018) 177:265–285 
1 3
Le Grand, G. (1999). Competition, cooperation, or control? Tales from the British National Health Ser-
vice. Health Affairs, 18, 27–39.
Lester, J. P., Franke, J. L., Bowman, O’. M. A., & Kramer, K. W. (1983). Hazardous wastes, politics and 
public policy: A comparative state analysis. Western Political Quarterly, 36, 257–285.
Levaggi, R., & Zanola, R. (2003). Flypaper effect and sluggishness: Evidence from regional health 
expenditure in Italy. International Tax and Public Finance, 10, 535–547.
Maio, V., & Manzoli, L. (2002). The Italian health care system: W.H.O. ranking versus public percep-
tion. P&T, Pharmacy and Therapeutics, 27, 301–308.
Mapelli, V. (2012). Il sistema sanitario italiano. Bologna: il Mulino.
McDaid, D., Wiley, M., Maresso, A., & Mossialos, E. (2009). Ireland: Health system review. Health 
Systems in Transition, 11, 1–268.
Migué, J., & Bélanger, G. (1974). Toward a general theory of managerial discretion. Public Choice, 17, 
27–43.
Miller, G. J. (1977). Bureaucratic compliance as a game on the unit square. Public Choice, 29, 37–51.
Moe, T. M. (1984). The new economics of organization. American Political Science Review, 88, 
739–777.
Moe, T. M. (2012). Delegation, control, and the study of public bureaucracy. The Forum, 10 (2), article 
4.
Nikaidȏ, H., & Isoda, K. (1955). Note on noncooperative convex games. Pacific Journal of Mathematics, 
5, 807–815.
Niskanen, W. A. (1971). Bureaucracy and representative government. Chicago: Aldine Atherton.
Pellizzari, M. (2013). The use of welfare by migrants in Italy. International Journal of Manpower, 34, 
155–166.
Pollitt, C. (2007). New Labor’s re-disorganization. Public Management Review, 9, 529–543.
Schiavone, A. (2008). L’efficienza tecnica degli ospedali pubblici italiani. Questioni di Economia e Finanza 
n. 29, Banca d’Italia.
Scott, A. (1996). Primary or secondary care? What can economics contribute to evaluation at the interface? 
Journal of Public Health Medicine, 18, 19–26.
Singh, N., & Vives, X. (1984). Price and quantity competition in a differentiated duopoly. RAND Journal of 
Economics, 15, 546–554.
Talbot, C., & Johnson, C. (2007). Seasonal cycles in public management: Disaggregation and re-aggrega-
tion. Public Money & Management, 27, 53–60.
Ting, M. M. (2002). A theory of jurisdictional assignments in bureaucracies. American Journal of Political 
Science, 46, 364–378.
Turchetti, G. (2009). The interaction of public and private systems in healthcare provision: The Italian two-
faced Janus. European Papers on the New Welfare, 11, 110–122.
van Dijk, C., Korevaar, J. C., Koopmans, B., de Jong, J. D., & de Bakker, D. H. (2014). The primary-
secondary care interface: Does provision of more services in primary care reduce referrals to medical 
specialists? Health Policy, 118, 48–55.
Wright, D. B., & Ricketts, T. C., III. (2010). The road to efficiency? Re-examining the impact of the primary 
care physician workforce on health care utilization rates. Social Science and Medicine, 70, 2006–2010.
